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Case Comment
Authority of Secretary of State to Revoke Passports
for National Security or Foreign Policy Reasons:
Haig v. Agee
Beginning in 1974, Philip Agee, a former Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) employee, conducted a personal campaign
against his former employers, which included publishing lists
of CIA agents active in various countries.' The United States
government did not directly respond to Agee's activities 2 until
December 1979,3 when the Secretary of State revoked Agee's
1. See P. AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY (1975); DIRTY WoR:
THE CIA IN WESTERN EUROPE (P. Agee & L Wolf, eds. 1978). Agee was em-
ployed by the CIA as an operations officer from 1957 until he resigned in late
1968. Since his resignation Agee has revealed the identities of current and for-
mer CIA agents in an effort to incite "peoples victimized by the CIA... [to]
bring pressure on their... governments to expel the CIA people." Agee, Ex-
posing the CIA, COUNTERSPY, Winter 1974-75, reprinted in DmTv Womu: THE
CIA N WESTERN EUROPE, supra, at 40-43. Agee published lists of the names of
those agents he knew, even though his information may have been outdated.
P. AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY, supra, at 599-622; DmTY WoRx: THE
CIA IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra, at 343-734.
2. Great Britain and Holland previously deported Agee on national secur-
ity grounds. DmTY WoRi: THE CIA N WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 286,
300. Although the United States government apparently did not protest these
actions, it did intervene in a separate action brought by Agee against the CIA
under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), in which Agee
sought access to all CIA files and records pertaining to himself. In that action
the Government sought an injunction to enforce the Agency's contractual se-
crecy agreement with Agee. Relying on a recent Supreme Court decision up-
holding the validity of such agreements, Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507
(1980), the district court issued the injunction. Agee v. CIA, 500 F. Supp. 506,
508-10 (D.D.C. 1980).
3. The government notified Agee of its passport revocation action on De-
cember 23, 1979, Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980), just six days af-
ter a New York Post article reported that Agee was at the "top" of the Iran
government's list of candidates to participate as a judge in a trial of the Ameri-
can hostages taken captive during the seizure of the United States embassy in
Tehran on November 4, 1979. N.Y. Post, Dec. 17, 1979, at 1, col 1. The article did
not state that Agee had accepted any offer, and Agee denied that the Iranian
government made any invitation. Affidavit of Philip Agee, Joint Appendix for
Writ of Certiorari at 29, Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981). The Supreme
Court's opinion does not discuss the exact role of the article or of the Iranian
crisis generally as an impetus for the Carter administration's actions against
Agee. Undersecretary of State David Newsome, however, believed both the Ira-
nian situation and the Post article were directly responsible for the govern-
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passport,4 basing the action on a State Department regulation
permitting the Secretary to revoke a passport when the Secre-
tary determines that a person's "activities abroad are causing
or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or
the foreign policy of the United States."5 Agee filed suit against
the Secretary of State seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief.6 The federal district court granted Agee summary judg-
ment and ordered the Secretary to return Agee's passport.7
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit af-
firmed,8 holding that the Passport Act of 19269 did not grant the
Executive explicit authority to revoke passports for national se-
curity reasons and that the government failed to establish the
ment's actions. Affidavit of David Newsome, Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at
103a (App. D), Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981). John McMahon, Deputy Di-
rector of Operations for the CIA, also indicated that the Post article was an ex-
ample of the type of threat Agee represented to United States security.
Affidavit of John McMahon, Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 116a (App. F),
Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981). The Court's failure to discuss the impact of
the Iranian crisis and the Post article is unfortunate. See notes 77-78 infra and
accompanying text.
4. The State Department notified Agee of this action, as required by 22
C..R. § 51.75 (1981), stating-
The reasons for the Secretary's determination are, in summary, as fol-
lows: Since the early 1970's it has been your stated intention to con-
duct a continuous campaign to disrupt the intelligence operations of
the United States. In carrying out that campaign you have traveled in
various countries (including, among others, Mexico, the United King-
dom, Denmark, Jamaica, Cuba, and Germany), and your activities in
those countries have caused serious damage to the national security
and foreign policy of the United States. Your stated intention to con-
tinue such activities threatens additional damage of the same kind.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 120a (App. G), Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766
(1981). Agee conceded the Government's averments for the purposes of his
summary judgment motion. Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766, 2772 (1981).
The State Department also advised Agee of his right to an administrative
hearing. See 22 C.F_.R §§ 51.80-89 (1981). Agee elected not to use this provision,
filing suit in federal district court instead. 101 S. Ct. at 2771.
5. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b) (4) (1981). In conjunction with this regulation, the
Secretary also used section 51.71(a). Section 51.70 deals with the initial denial
of passports, and section 51.71(a) adds that a "passport may be revoked...
where the national would not be entitled to issuance of a new passport under
§ 51.70."
6. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980). Agee also raised consti-
tutional challenges to the Secretary's action. Agee contended that the revoca-
tion was an impermissible restriction on both his freedom to travel and his
freedom of expression and that the lack of a prerevocation hearing violated
fifth amendment due process guarantees. Id. at 730; Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct.
2766, 2781 (1981). See notes 52-58, 80-83 infra and accompanying text.
7. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729, 732 (D.D.C. 1980).
8. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980). At each level of appellate
court review, the name of the current Secretary of State was substituted as the
party in interest.
9. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976). See note 15 infra.
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substantial and consistent administrative practice necessary
for the court to find implicit congressional approval of the De-
partment's regulation.10 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed,"n holding that the State Department's consistent
construction of the Passport Act of 192612 and of the regulation
allowing revocation of Agee's passport for national security rea-
sons was sufficient to warrant implied congressional approval.
Furthermore, the Court held that the revocation did not violate
Agee's constitutionally protected right to travel, right of speech,
or due process guarantees. Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766
(1981).13
Governmental regulation of passport requirements in the
United States is basically an ad hoc process. Congress passed
the first national passport legislation in 1856, vesting the exclu-
sive authority to issue passports in the executive branch.14
Congress eventually codified the language of this act in the
Passport Act of 1926.15 The Passport Act did not grant specific
authority to refuse or to revoke passports, but this is not sur-
prising since Congress did not require passports for interna-
tional travel by United States citizens, except during periods of
10. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The Court of Appeals
derived this test from two prior Supreme Court decisions, Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958), and Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). See notes 22-38 infra and
accompanying text.
11. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority. 101 S. Ct. at 2769. Justice
Blackmun fied a concurring opinion. 101 S. Ct. at 2783. Justice Brennan's dis-
sent was joined by Justice Marshall. 101 S. Ct. at 2784.
12. See note 15 infra.
13. Although it is not known whether Agee will attempt to publish further
material about the CIA without prior agency clearance, see note 2 supra, one
postscript to Agee's case has emerged. Subsequent to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Haig v. Agee, the government of Grenada issued a passport to Agee,
allowing him to continue his foreign travel and activities. Philip Agee's
Grenadian Passport, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 10, 1981, at 15.
14. Act of August 18, 1856, Ch. 127, § 23, 11 Stat. 52. Prior to this time no
law regulated passport issuance. Both states and local governmental units
could issue passports. The main purpose behind the national law was merely
to centralize the issuance of passports in one office, not to create any new au-
thority in that position. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting).
15. Act of July 3, 1926, Pub. L. No. 493, 44 Stat. 887. The basic language of
the statute has received only minor alteration since its inception in 1856. It cur-
rently states: "The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports ... under
such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of
the United States, and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such pass-
ports." 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976). The one minor change from the original text oc-
curred in 1874, when Congress amended the language "shall be authorized to
grant and issue passports" to the present form, thus accentuating the Secretary
of State's basic discretionary authority. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 131 (1958)
(Clark, J., dissenting). See also notes 36-38 infra and accompanying text.
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
war or national emergency, until passage of the Immigration
and Nationality Act16 in 1952. The Secretary of State has never-
theless claimed the necessary authority under the Passport Act
to deny or to revoke passports for national security or foreign
policy reasons. Such authority has been based on a series of
executive orders, regulations, and State Department opinions,17
generated through the rulemaking authority which the Pass-
port Act gives to the Executive.' 8 Current State Department
passport regulations also require United States citizens to have
valid passports for travel to Cuba and to all nations beyond the
Western Hemisphere.' 9 Consequently, the authority to revoke
a passport can severely limit a person's ability to travel abroad
legally. Nevertheless, the Secretary rarely attempts to deny or
to revoke a citizen's passport on national security or foreign
policy grounds,2 0 and the Court in Agee identified only one
16. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 215, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified in pertinent part at 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1976)). The Act indefinitely
extended the Executive's national emergency regulatory power over foreign
travel, a power which had continuously existed since 1941. This Act made a
passport for the first time a necessary document for American citizens to leave
the United States for travel beyond the Western Hemisphere, and not just an
entry document required by some foreign nations. In 1978, Congress amended
the Immigration and Nationality Act, making it illegal to depart or to enter the
United States without a valid passport, Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-426,
§ 707(b), 92 Stat. 992 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (Supp. 1979)), except for travel
to areas excluded by the President.
17. The Court in Agee listed the following "unbroken line" of orders and
regulations: Exec. Order No. 4800 (1928); Exec. Order No. 5860 (1932); Exec. Or-
der No. 7856, 3 C.F.R. § 379 (1936-38); 6 Fed. Reg. 5821, 6069-70, 6349 (1941) (ex-
ception to restrictions on aliens leaving United States for travel to Panama); 17
Fed. Reg. 8013 (1952) (limitations on issuance of passports to Communists or to
those likely to violate United States law); and 21 Fed. Reg. 336 (1956) (limita-
tion on issuance of passports to those whose activities abroad are likely to vio-
late United States law or are prejudicial to interests of the United States or the
conduct of its foreign policy). Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. at 277 n. 39-40. Circuit
Judge MacKinnon's dissent also noted each of these orders and regulations. In
addition, MacKinnon cited an Attorney General opinion issued prior to passage
of the Passport Act of 1926, 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 509, 511 (1901) (authority to deny
passport to avowed anarchist), to support the assumption of congressional
awareness of the Secretary's belief. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 99-100 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
18. See note 15 supra.
19. 22 C.F.R. § 53.2(b) (1981). The pertinent part of the regulation states
that a United States citizen is not required to bear a valid passport "[w]hen
traveling between the United States and any country, territory, or island adja-
cent thereto in North, South or Central America excluding Cuba."
20. Both the Supreme Court majority opinion and Circuit Judge MacKin-
non's dissent noted these instances, which included the 1948 denial of a pass-
port to Congressman Leo Isacson, an American Labor Party member who
wished to attend a Paris conference on the possibility of aiding rebels trying to
overthrow the Greek government, and the 1954 passport revocation of a man
supplying guns to groups abroad. Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. at 2779; Agee v. Mus-
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other revocation under the challenged regulation.2 1
The United States Supreme Court has ruled on only a few
cases challenging the validity of State Department regulations
promulgated under the Passport Act. In the first major court
challenge, Kent v. Dulles,22 the Secretary of State denied the
passport applications of two Communists,23 acting under a De-
partment regulation that prohibited the issuance of passports
to Communist Party members or to persons going abroad to en-
gage in activities enhancing the Communist movement. 24 The
Court invalidated the regulation, ruling that the freedom to
travel is a "liberty" protected by the fifth amendment 25 and
Ide, 629 F.2d 80, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). For other ex-
amples of passport denials or revocations, see Developments in the Law-The
National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARv. L REV. 1130, 1150-51
n.76 (1972); Note, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues
and Judicial Review, 61 YALE L.J. 171, 174-78 (1952).
21. Sirhan v. Rogers, No. 70-3965 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1970), appeal dis-
missed, No. 70-35364 (2d Cir. Sept. 11, 1970). In this case the mother of Sirhan
Sirhan, convicted murderer of Robert F. Kennedy, and her attorney, Luke Mc-
Kissack, hoped to travel to Jordan, the landing site of an airplane hijacked by
the Palestine Liberation Organization. During a stopover on their route from
Los Angeles, State Department officials revoked their passports at Kennedy
Airport in New York under the same regulation applied to Agee. Sirhan and
McKissack sought temporary relief from the action, but the federal district
court denied their request, and the Second Circuit affirmed on the same day.
Plaintiffs abandoned their journey at this point and did not directly challenge
the regulation. The decision did not result in a written opinion. Telephone
conversation with Melvin L. Wulf, New York, New York, attorney for Sirhan
(October 21, 1981).
22. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). Due to the extreme distrust of Communists preva-
lent in America during the 1950s, and the belief that the State Department's
regulation clearly had congressional approval, much of the contemporaneous
discussion was critical of the decision. See, e.g., Note, Authority of Secretary of
State To Determine Standards for Issuance of Passports, 27 FoRDHAm L REV.
416, 426-29 (1958); The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARv. L REV. 77, 172-76
(1958); of. Note, Passport Denial As A Security Measure, 43 MIN. L. REV. 126,
136-37 (1958) (instead of denying passports to subversives, their activities can
be prevented by criminal prosecution). Congress had also passed a statutoiy
ban on issuing passports to Communists, upon which the Department based its
regulation. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, § 6, 64
Stat. 987. The Court later invalidated this section in Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). See note 47 infra.
23. 357 U.S. at 117-19.
24. 22 C.F. § 51.135 (1949 & Supp. 1957).
25. The freedom to travel abroad does not share the same history as the
right of interstate traveL The Court has recognized that the right to travel
freely between states was a necessary part of the free flow of commerce pro-
tected by the Constitution, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867), an
aspect of the privileges and immunities protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 197-98 (1941) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring), and an "elementary" right inherent in the Constitution, United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). Courts require the showing of a compelling gov-
ernment interest to uphold government interference with the right to travel or
1982]
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that any regulation of the freedom to travel must be made pur-
suant to the congressional lawmaking function and must there-
fore be narrowly construed.26 Since the Secretary lacked
express authority to deny passports, only an administrative
practice clearly adopted by Congress would allow the Court to
uphold the implied delegation of its lawmaking function.27 The
Court did not find an established administrative practice in
Kent, and emphasizing that it was improper to deny a passport
an attempt to penalize that right. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250, 254 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1968). For example, one
such interest which the Court upheld was the obligation to give testimony in
another state. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 7 (1959).
The Kent decision recognized freedom to travel abroad as a distinct part of
the right to travel, although the Court did not need to decide the extent to
which Congress or the Executive could curtail this right. Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. at 127. The Court's decision in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,
507-08 (1964), see note 47 infra, suggested that freedom to travel abroad
deserved first amendment protection, but the Court later rejected first amend-
ment protection of international travel in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 16-17, see
text accompanying notes 29-35 infra. The Zemel decision, along with an earlier
circuit court decision upholding area restrictions, Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d
905, 910 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959), clearly stated that the gov-
ernment could subject the freedom of international travel, as derived from the
fifth amendment due process clause, to some regulation. Zemel v. Rusk 381
U.S. at 14-16.
26. 357 U.S. at 125-29.
27. Id. at 124-25, 128. The Court in Kent admitted that the Secretary of
State's authority over passport issuance is broadly stated, but found that the
State Department had actually interpreted this authority narrowly. Only in
those areas indicated in the language of the statute-the areas of citizenship, in
which the Secretary had authority to resolve questions concerning the alle-
giance of a passport applicant, and of criminal activity, in which the Secretary
could apparently deny passports to those violating United States law or seeking
to escape the law--did the Court find that Congress adopted prior administra-
tive practice when it passed the Passport Act of 1926. The Court hestitated to
impute to Congress an intent to give unbridled discretion to the Secretary of
State to withhold a passport, stating that delegated congressional powers which
could impinge on the freedom to travel should be narrowly construed. Id. at
127-29. The Kent Court further refused to consider passport restrictions during
wartime as material, viewing them as arising under the war power of the Exec-
utive. Id. at 123.
Subsequently, courts literally followed the Kent Court's warning to con-
strue narrowly the Executive's authority to restrict international travel Two
decisions in particular challenged the State Department's implied passport au-
thority. In Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court recognized the
legitimacy of the area travel restrictions upheld in Zemel v. Rusk, see notes 29-
35 infra and accompanying text, but held that the Department possessed no in-
herent or implied power to restrict a person's travel to nonrestricted countries
when that person refused to provide assurances that he or she would not also
travel to a restricted nation. 389 F.2d at 947-49. In Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F.
Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1972), a'd, 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court held that
the State Department's requirement of an oath of allegiance to obtain a pass-
port similarly lacked implicit congressional approval and, therefore, impermis-
sibly interfered with the fifth amendment freedom to travel. 344 F. Supp. at 989.
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solely because of a person's beliefs and associations.28
Seven years later in Zemel v. Rusk,29 the Court allowed a
restriction of the freedom to travel by upholding a complete
ban on travel to Cuba.30 Applying the standard developed in
Kent, the Court found a substantial and consistent State De-
partment practice of restricting travel to named geographic ar-
eas, both in wartime and peacetime, sufficient to warrant a
conclusion that Congress was aware of the Secretary's policy
and implicitly approved of such restrictions. 31 The Zemel
Court dismissed constitutional challenges to the Department's
regulation. Although acknowledging that fifth amendment due
process guarantees protected the right to travel,32 the Court
reasoned that if the government could restrict travel inside the
United States to protect the safety and welfare of natural disas-
ter areas or of the nation,33 then the State Department could
similarly restrict international travel to Cuba based on "the
weightiest considerations of national security" 34 without violat-
ing due process. Viewing this restriction as only inhibiting ac-
tion, the Court also rejected the appellant's argument that the
regulation abridged the appellant's first amendment rights to
speak and to publish.35
28. 357 U.S. at 130.
29. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). For contemporary discussions of the decision, see The
Supreme Court; 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L REV. 56, 123-28 (1965); Comment, Con-
gress May Delegate Its Legislative Authority To Impose Passport Area Con-
trols, 50 MINN. L. REV. 977 (1966).
30. 381 U.S. at 15-16. After the Castro takeover, the United States severed
diplomatic relations with Cuba. The State Department eliminated Cuba from
the area for which passports were not required for United States citizens, see
note 19 supra, and declared all existing United States passports invalid for
travel to or in Cuba. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 17-18 (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 128). The Zemel Court
noted, among others, restrictions imposed for Americans traveling to Belgium
in 1915, to Germany and Austria after World War I, to Ethiopia in 1935, to Spain
during the Spanish Civil War in 1936, to China in 1937, and to the entire East-
ern European bloc of Communist nations after World War XE. Id. at 8-11. The
Executive imposed these restrictions either during wartime conditions or im-
mediately afterwards, and lifted them soon thereafter, except for those involv-
ing the Communist nations.
32. Id. at 14 (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 125). The Zemel Court
stated that the requirements of due process forced it to examine not only the
extent of the governmental restriction, but also the necessity for the restriction.
Id. at 14. This balancing approach provided a framework for the Court to up-
hold the regulation and is similar to the majority's approach in Agee. See text
accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
33. 381 U.S. at 15-16.
34. Id. at 16.
35. Id. The majority in Agee also used this same conduct-belief distinc-
tion. See text accompanying notes 57-58 infra. The Zemel Court stated that
"[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right
1982]
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After Zemel, few developments occurred in the law gov-
erning passports until the Court's decision in Haig v. Agee.
Congress made the most significant change in 1978, when it lim-
ited the Executive's authority to impose the area travel restric-
tions previously upheld in Zemel.36 Under this amendment to
the Passport Act, the State Department may impose area re-
strictions only in time of war or if United States travelers are in
imminent danger.37 Congress, however, did not make any
changes in the basic authority of the Secretary of State to enact
passport regulations, a fact that later influenced the Agee
Court.38
The United States Supreme Court in Haig v. Agee rejected
the argument that only a consistent pattern of actual enforce-
ment of the challenged regulation can establish the necessary
implicit congressional approval needed to satisfy the Kent-
Zemel standard.39 Although the Court recognized enforcement
as one method of establishing congressional awareness and ap-
proval of the regulation, it stated that courts could also find ap-
proval from nothing more than congressional silence about a
longstanding administrative policy.40 The Court concluded that
to gather information." 381 U.S. at 17. Justice Douglas, who authored the
Court's opinions in Kent v. Dulles and in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, dis-
sented in Zemel. Although Douglas agreed that the Court could uphold war-
time travel restrictions or necessary bans on travel to areas of natural disaster,
he did not agree with the majority's first amendment analysis. Douglas argued
that the right to travel enjoyed not only fifth amendment protection, but also
was peripheral to first amendment rights, and that the right "to observe social,
physical, political and other phenomena abroad ... gives meaning and sub-
stance to freedom of expression and freedom of the press." 381 U.S. at 24
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Any restrictions on the freedom to travel abroad,
therefore, must be narrow and precise. Id. at 25.
36. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. T. 95-426,
§ 124, 92 Stat. 963 (amending 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976)). The following provision
was added to the statute:
Unless authorized by law, a passport may not be designated as re-
stricted for travel to or for use in any country other than a country with
which the United States is at war, where armed hostilities are in pro-
gress, or where there is imminent danger to the public health or the
physical safety of United States travellers [sic].
22 U.S.C. § 211a (Supp. MII 1979).
37. 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (Supp. I 1979).
38. 101 S. Ct. at 2779. See note 70 infra.
39. 101 S. Ct. at 2779-80. Both the federal district court and the circuit court
relied upon this basic argument in invalidating the State Department's regula-
tion. Agee v. Muslde, 629 F.2d 80, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Agee v. Vance, 483 F.
Supp. 729, 731 (D.D.C. 1980).
40. 101 S. CL at 2778. The majority refers to four prior cases supporting
this assertion: Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1,
16-18 (1965); Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 313
(1933); and Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1932). The Court's reli-
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Congress had impliedly adopted the administrative construc-
tion, because Congress had not made any changes in the Exec-
utive's basic rulemaking power when passing the Immigration
and Nationality Act in 195241 or when amending the Passport
Act in 1978,42 even though the legislature must have been
aware of the "longstanding and officially promulgated view" of
the State Department that the Executive could revoke pass-
ports for reasons of national security.43 The Court did not re-
quire frequent instances of actual enforcement. In fact, few
cases requiring enforcement of the Secretary's passport revoca-
tion authority have arisen.44 Even if no enforcement occurred,
the validity of the Executive's authority would not be de-
stroyed, nor would it preclude congressional awareness of the
Department's construction. 4 5 Furthermore, the Court believed
ance upon these decisions, however, is misplaced. The Court in Zemel found a
consistent history of imposing area travel restrictions both before passage of
the Passport Act of 1926 and afterward. 381 U.S. at 8-9. This administrative
practice, not merely the State Department's construction of its regulation, al-
lowed the Court to uphold the ban on travel to Cuba. Id. at 12. Similarly, Udall
dealt with the Interior Department's Public Land Order No. 487, which granted
authority to issue oil and gas leases on public lands in Alaska. The Court
showed deference to the Department's interpretation of the order, but again a
clear pattern of actual practice emerged over many years; the entire area in dis-
pute had been developed based upon the challenged order and the Secretary of
the Interior's interpretation. Id. at 17-18. Norwegian Nitrogen focused on an in-
crease in the rate of duty on sodium nitrite proclaimed by the President and
the Tariff Commission and whether the petitioner had a right to a hearing
before the issuance of the new provisions, including access to the Commis-
sion's data. 288 U.S. at 297-99. The Court viewed the Commission's consistent
administrative practice of treating its collected data as akin to a trade secret,
and, therefore, the Court could properly surmise congressional acquiescence
from congressional silence. Id. at 311-13. Significantly, the Court stated that
"[t]he administrative practice before the Act of 1922 might be too desultory and
brief to fix the meaning of the statute if it did not find support, and that unmis-
takable and ample, in administrative practice afterwards." Id. at 311. In these
three decisions the Court did not equate congressional silence with congres-
sional approval based only on the administrative construction as the majority
in Agee claims. An established and consistent administrative practice existed
to demonstrate Congress's awareness of the construction in each case.
In the fourth case cited by the Agee majority, Costanzo v. Tillinghast, the
Court deferred to the Labor Department's construction of its regulation on de-
portation of aliens managing houses of prostitution. 287 U.S. at 341. That case,
however, focused on the narrow technical aspect of a preliminary clause in the
statute, its carryover effect on later clauses, and the grammatical importance of
the comma at the end of the phrase. The Court held that absent clear congres-
sional disapproval of the Labor Department's interpretation, a presumption
arose in its favor. Id. at 344-45.
41. See note 16 supra.
42. See note 36 supra.
43. 101 S. Ct. at 2778-79.
44. Id. at 2779-80.
45. Id.
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that the Secretary used his authority in a consistent manner
when faced with such situations.46
The Supreme Court attempted to distinguish the facts in
Kent v. Dulles47 from the facts in Agee, noting that in Kent the
State Department had inconsistently enforced the regulation
denying passports to Communist Party members; conse-
quently, no definite policy existed of which Congress could ap-
prove.48 The Court, on the other hand, stated that the
Secretary had consistently, albeit infrequently, enforced the
regulation involved in Agee, allowing revocation on national se-
curity grounds.49 The majority also rejected Agee's argument
that the two areas of administrative practice, resolving ques-
tions of citizenship and possible criminal conduct,50 which the
Kent Court upheld as having congressional statutory approval,
are exclusive. The Court reasoned that the Kent Court ruled
only on passport restrictions based on belief or association and
had no need to consider whether Congress had also implicitly
authorized passport restrictions based on a person's national
security-threatening conduct L51
The Supreme Court also briefly dealt with Agee's constitu-
tional challenges to the passport revocation.5 2 To counter
Agee's fifth amendment due process argument, the Court en-
gaged in an unexplained balancing of the interests involved,53
46. Id. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 22-28 supra and accompanying text. The Court also distin-
guished the facts in Agee from the facts in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964). Aptheker, like Kent v. Dulles, involved a denial of passports to
Communist Party members. While the Court decided Kent on the grounds that
Congress had not implicitly authorized the State Department regulation,
Aptheker involved an explicit statutory prohibition on the issuance of pass-
ports to Communists. See Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No.
831, § 6, 64 Stat. 987. The Court invalidated this section as unconstitutionally
overbroad. 378 U.S. at 514.
48. 101 S. Ct. at 2780.
49. Id.
50. See note 27 supra.
51. 101 S. Ct. at 2780-81. The majority did not refer to Zemel v. Rusk to sup-
port this reasoning, but the Zemel Court applied a very similar analysis in con-
cluding that the Kent holding did not prohibit the ban on travel to Cuba. 381
U.S. at 12-13.
52. Agee had challenged the action as an impermissible burden on his
freedom to travel and a restriction on his free speech and ability to criticize the
government. In addition, he claimed the failure of the State Department to pro-
vide a prerevocation hearing violated fifth amendment guarantees of due pro-
cess. 101 S. Ct. at 2781-83. See note 6 supra.
53. The approach taken by the majority in adjudicating Agee's constitu-
tional claims appears to answer the argument, raised by Justice Brennan's dis-
sent, that Agee's complaint raised first amendment issues of free speech and
that a balancing of this infringement against competing government interests
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stating that "[i]t is 'obvious and unarguable' that no govern-
mental interest is more compelling than the security of the Na-
tion."54 The Court differentiated between the freedom to travel
abroad and the right to travel inside the United States.55 It ac-
knowledged that travel within the United States is a protected
constitutional right, whereas the freedom to travel abroad,
though a part of the individual's liberty protected by the fifth
amendment, is subordinate to national security and foreign pol-
icy considerations. The government, therefore, may regulate
foreign travel within the limits of due process. 56 The Court
was the proper analysis. Because he did not find an implied authorization, Jus-
tice Brennan did not need to address directly the first amendment issue. See
101 S. Ct. at 2788-89 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 2782 (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509
(1964)).
55. The Court admitted that interstate travel is a virtually unlimited right.
Although not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, courts consider it an
"elementary" constitutional right also protected under the federal commerce
power. See note 25 supra.
For its assertion, however, that the Executive may restrain international
travel, the Court relied on Califano v. Aznovarian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978). The re-
spondent in that case argued that the Court must judge provisions of the Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI) program, 42 U.S.C. § 1382(f) (1976), which
provide that needy, aged, or disabled persons shall not receive benefits during
months the recipient entirely spends outside the United States, under a strin-
gent constitutional standard, because they limited the freedom to travel
abroad. The Court, however, stated that the legislation involved had only an
incidental effect on foreign travel and, therefore, unless wholly irrational, was
constitutional 439 U.S. at 176-77. Since the challenged SSI provision was an ec-
onomic regulation, the Court had no difficulty applying a lower degree of scru-
tiny. The Court further noted, however, that this regulation's impact on
international travel was not as great as would be the impact of a restriction
which limited the availability of passports or conflicted with the first amend-
ment, indicating that such actions might bring more important fifth amendment
due process guarantees into question. Id. The majority in Agee disregarded
this warning and applied the lower level of scrutiny to Agee's constitutional ar-
guments. See also Gillers, Reasoning Not The Need, THE NATION, July 25, 1981,
at 67.
56. The Court stated that due process guarantees demand no more than
the offer of a prompt post revocation administrative hearing and a statement of
reasons for the action. The State Department provided both to Agee. 101 S. Ct.
at 2783.
The State Department regulations covering its hearing and review proce-
dures are at 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.80-.89 (1981). The Court previously indicated that a
presuspension hearing was not required for government employees whose po-
sitions affected national security. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 (1956). Simi-
larly, the majority in Agee concluded that the State Department need not hold
a prerevocation hearing for national security passport revocations. The Court
did disregard, however, the following warning in Cole, concerning the showing
of a national security threat. "In the absence of an immediate threat of harm to
the 'national security,' the normal... procedures seem fully adequate and the
justification for summary powers disappears." Id. at 546. See also note 73
infra.
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pointed out that Agee is still free to criticize the government;5 7
the passport revocation restricts only Agee's actions, not his
speech.58
Justice Brennan's dissent59 also focused on the Kent-Zemel
standard, but he concluded that in Agee's case the federal dis-
trict and circuit courts correctly applied the consistent enforce-
ment test to the challenged regulation.60 Brennan accused the
majority of sub silentio overruling the Kent-Zemel standard to
reach its desired decision,61 because only an established prac-
tice of actual passport denials and not merely an administrative
construction can assure the Court that congressional silence
means congressional approval.
Justice Brennan was correct in accusing the majority of ef-
fectively overruling the Kent-Zemel standard by allowing a
State Department construction of its own regulation to be a
sufficient basis for implicit congressional approval of a passport
regulation. A close reading of the Court's decision in Kent v.
Dulles indicates that the Court rejected a similar assertion of
State Department authority as being satisfactory to warrant im-
plicit congressional approval, holding that only an established
departmental practice can convince the Court that Congress
was adequately aware of the claimed authority to justify im-
plied delegation of its legislative powers.62 The Kent Court be-
lieved that implicit approval was proper only for the two
57. 101 S. Ct. at 2783. The majority is apparently referring only to oral ex-
pression, because the district court previously enjoined Agee from publishing
or otherwise making use of information in a manner violating his contractual
secrecy agreement with the CIA, unless cleared by the Agency in advance. See
Agee v. CIA, 500 F. Supp. 506 (D.D.C. 1980); note 2 supra.
58. 101 S. Ct. at 2783. The Court stated that while the passport denial in
Kent v. Dulles was solely based upon the beliefs and associations of Commu-
nist Party members, Agee's situation involved conduct, not just beliefs, and
therefore did not deserve the same constitutional protection. Id. at 2780-81.
59. 101 S. Ct. at 2784 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2788. Even those who would restore Agee's passport and invali-
date the State Department's regulation apparently felt little joy at championing
Agee's cause. Justice Brennan called Agee "hardly a model representative of
our Nation." Id. Judge Robb, writirig for the circuit court majority, admitted
that "Agee's conduct may be considered by some to border on treason," but ad-
ded that "[w]e are bound by the law as we find it." Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80,
87 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he ac-
knowledged "some force" in Brennan's accusation. Blackmun noted that the
majority was "cutting back somewhat upon the opinions in those cases sub
silentio" and wanted the Court to state openly that a longstanding administra-
tive construction is probative of implicit congressional authorization. 101 S. Ct
at 2783-84 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
62. 357 U.S. at 127-28.
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statutorily defined areas where a clear regulatory practice al-
ready existed, and it hesitated to go any further.63 The State
Department's national security regulation challenged by Agee
could not satisfy this standard. The government cannot be
faulted,64 because few opportunities have arisen requiring
passport revocations under the regulation. Nevertheless, a defi-
nite pattern of actual enforcement of this regulation simply
cannot emerge from only one or two applications and certainly
not from a mere assertion of power without any instances of
enforcement. Despite attempts to catalogue examples of ad-
ministrative enforcement of the national security passport rev-
ocation power, the majority in Haig v. Agee did not require any
examples of administrative practice to uphold the regulation.
The Executive's simple assertion of its possession of the requi-
site power was sufficient for the Court.65
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, however, the
Agee majority's support for the Executive's construction of this
regulation relied upon many of the examples previously cited
by the government in Kent, examples the Kent Court expressly
rejected as insufficient to establish congressional approval.66
Regardless of the Agee majority's attempt to distinguish the
facts from those in Kent,67 the Court in fact substituted a new
standard, allowing it to find implicit congressional approval of a
passport regulation either from a pattern of actual enforcement
or from congressional silence in the face of a longstanding
agency construction of its own regulation. This substitution ef-
fectively overrules the more rigorous enforcement standard for
passport denials or revocations envisioned by the Kent Court.
Even under the Court's new standard, congressional ap-
proval of the challenged regulation is questionable. The Court
63. Id. See note 27 supra.
64. Justice Brennan's dissent stressed this point in answering the major-
ity's attempt to distinguish the facts in Agee from those in Kent. Brennan re-
jected the assertion that since the administration had so few opportunities to
enforce the regulation, a consistent pattern of actual enforcement as required
by the Kent-Zemel standard is irrelevant. 101 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (Brennan, 3., dis-
senting). Justice Brennan pointed out that although the government cannot be
faulted because few occasions arose, the area of passport revocation concerns
constitutional rights and, therefore, must be narrowly construed. Brennan ar-
gued that a presumption should arise against implied delegation of congres-
sional authority and that the Court's precedents require the necessary
"substantial and consistent" practice to overcome the presumption. Id. at 2788.
65. Id. at 2779-80.
66. Id. at 2786 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 124-
25.
67. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
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admitted that the legislative history of the Passport Act was
particularly sparse. 68 Nevertheless, it confidently stated that
"the legislative history clearly shows congressional awareness
of the Executive policy."69 The Court also emphasized that
Congress did not alter the basic rulemaking authority of the
Secretary when it amended the Passport Act in 197870 and con-
sidered this absence of action indicative of Congress's ap-
proval. Yet, in 1978, Congress expressly restricted the
Secretary's discretionary authority to invoke area travel restric-
tions,71 an action plainly inconsistent with the majority's con-
tention that Congress approved of the State Department's
passport revocation policy. A finding of congressional intent to
narrow the Secretary's discretion based on Congress's express
action in 1978 would be more convincing than the Court's find-
ing of intent to broaden authority based on a vague legislative
history.72
Even if the Court were correct in discerning Congress's in-
tent to delegate its passport rulemaking authority to the Execu-
tive, the Court's decision in Haig v. Agee gave the State
Department extremely broad latitude to deny or to revoke
passports on national security grounds. National security is a
fluid term susceptible to a changing definition, and the courts
68. 101 S. Ct. at 2777.
69. Id. The Court cited the House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearings
on the Passport Act of 1926 as its only authority for this summary statement.
Validity of Passports: Hearings on H.R. 11947 Before the House Comm. on For-
eign Affairs, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926). A careful reading of this document
does not support the Court's statement on legislative history. Only the re-
marks of Representative Hull of Illinois support the idea that the Secretary of
State must generally have discretion in the passport area. Id. at 5. Assistant
Secretary of State Wilbur Carr presented this idea to the Committee, explain-
ing that unforseen circumstances demand executive discretion and that admin-
istrative action better ensures passport issuance. Id. Any other discussion of
the State Department's authority to deny or to revoke passports for national se-
curity reasons is lacking.
70. The Court called the 1978 amendments "weighty evidence of congres-
sional approval of the Secretary's interpretation." 101 S. Ct. at 2779. Since the
Court was apparently convinced that Congress was aware of the Executive's
regulatory interpretation, see note 69 sqpra and accompanying text, this legisla-
tive inaction did not indicate disapproval, but approval.
71. See note 36 supra.
72. See S. REP. No. 842, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978). District Judge Ges-
sell's memorandum addressed the issue of congressional intent and of congres-
sional approval through silence. He wrote: "Legislative silence cannot be read
as implicit adoption of an obscure, virtually unused regulation .... This is par-
ticularly apparent where, as here, the action that Congress did take, i.e., cutting
back the Executive power over area travel restrictions conferred in Zemel, is
hardly receptive to implying additional delegated authority." Agee v. Vance,
483 F. Supp. 729, 732 (D.D.C. 1980).
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have only been willing to interpret it on a case-by-case basis,
providing little guidance for future identification of national se-
curity matters.7 3 The State Department did not define what
constitutes the serious national security or foreign policy dam-
73. When faced with national security cases, courts generally avoid di-
rectly attacking the issue or drawing any clear-cut lines indicating where na-
tional security interests begin or where they are no longer relevant. The Court
in Agee made no attempt to define national security, stating that "national se-
curity considerations cannot neatly be compartmentalized," but efforts to pro-
tect the secrecy of foreign intelligence operations are plainly within the Agee
Court's national security parameters. 101 S. Ct. at 2782. Similarly, although the
Zemel Court clearly perceived the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, as a
sufficient example of a national security threat to uphold the State Depart-
ment's travel ban to Cuba, it offered no further definition of national security.
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 16.
The Supreme Court has endeavored to define the concept of national se-
curity in relation to prior restraints of first amendment rights. The national se-
curity exception to the prior restraint doctrine emerged from two Supreme
Court decisions, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the "Pentagon Papers" case). The
doctrine allows governmental prior restraint of publication under certain poten-
tial national security situations. Again, no complete definition of what is suffi-
cient to satisfy this standard exists. Dictum in Near gave as an example the
attempted publication of troop strength or location during time of war, 283 U.S.
at 716, while the "Pentagon Papers" case rejected a Government-sought injunc-
tion on publishing excerpts of a classified study on the origins of United States
involvement in Vietnam, 403 U.S. at 714. Eight years later, the Government did
obtain an injunction against the publication of an article describing the work-
ings of the hydrogen bomb. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp.
990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979); Knoll, National
Security: The Ultimate Threat to the First Amendment, 66 MANN. L. REv. 161
(1981); Note, The National Security Exception to the Doctrine of Prior Restraint,
60 NEB. L. REv. 400 (1981). The district court in the Progressive case concluded
that the prior restraint exception standard required a showing that the publica-
tion would cause direct, immediate, and irreparable harm to the United States.
467 F. Supp. at 996. The Court in Agee, however, made no attempt to establish
that Agee's conduct surpassed this leveL Arguably, the Court did not need to
clarify this issue, because it remanded the case for further proceedings consis-
tent with its decision that the State Department has national security revoca-
tion authority.
Although the Court has not been willing to limit the Executive's discretion
in national security areas by any comprehensive definition, the Court has not
entirely deferred to the Executive. In United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), a case denying presidential authority to employ war-
rantless wiretap surveillance for domestic security, Justice Powell wrote:
We cannot accept the Government's argument that internal security
matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. Courts reg-
ularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society. There is no rea-
son to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or
uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases.
Id. at 320. Powell did caution, however, that he was dealing at that time only
with the domestic aspects of national security and expressed no opinion re-
garding security issues related to foreign powers. Id. at 321-22.
Although an imprecise standard for national security has the advantage of
flexibility, the creation of a clearer threshold standard, even if less demanding
than the showing of "direct, immediate, and irreparable harm" required in prior
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age required by the Department's regulation to allow revoca-
tion, because Agee admitted the government's allegations
against him for the summary judgment motion.74 Although the
Executive undoubtedly prefers unlimited discretion to react to
any conceivable emergency,75 thus far the broad language of
the regulation itself is the only limit on that discretion. By fail-
ing to define the parameters of national security or the regula-
tory language, the Agee Court enhanced the potential for abuse
of the Executive's discretion.76
The alleged possibility of Philip Agee's participation in
threatened trials of the American hostages in Iran, although
not explored by the Court,77 was arguably a real threat to
United States interests as perceived during the Iranian crisis.
Both the district court and the court of appeals acknowledged
the importance of the trials in the government's action.78 If the
Court had narrowly based its decision on the compelling secur-
ity interests present in Agee's situation instead of granting the
Executive broad discretion to revoke passports, the Court could
have allayed fears of future abuses of discretion. Furthermore,
the impact of the Supreme Court's ruling would not so precari-
ously depend upon the amount of sound judgment used by cur-
restraint situations, would allow the courts to adjudicate governmental national
security claims more consistently.
74. 101 S. Ct. at 2772; see note 4 supra. Agee's concession of the govern-
ment's averments was for procedural purposes only. Even if the government's
accusations were true, Agee nevertheless contended that the State Department
lacked the authority to revoke his passport.
75. See note 69 supra.
76. Although the Court created an unnecessarily broad national security
revocation power, the Court correctly decided not to create a further absolute
distinction between peacetime and wartime national security authority, a dis-
tinction made in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 127-28. Once the Court concludes,
whether rightly or wrongly, that the Secretary has discretion to revoke pass-
ports for national security reasons, then this authority should not be limited to
wartime situations. Modern national security interests exist during peacetime
as well as during wartime, as the impact of such "peacetime" occurrences as
the Cuban missile crisis, see text accompanying note 91 infra, or the Iranian
hostage crisis, see note 3 supra, indicate. If the Court, however, clearly estab-
lished the level of the national security threat necessary to uphold a passport
revocation, then it could have differentiated between levels for peacetime as
opposed to wartime national security threats, thereby lessening the far-reach-
ing implications of its decision.
77. The government did not claim to revoke Agee's passport on the basis of
the Iranian crisis, nor on the basis of the New York Post article. See notes 3-4
supra.
78. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Agee v. Vance, 483 F.
Supp. 729, 732 (D.D.C. 1980). See also The Court's Final Days: The Right to
Travel, NEwSWEEK, July 13, 1981, at 84. If Agee had actually attempted to travel
to Iran as feared, it is likely this action probably would have met the vague na-
tional security standards expressed by the courts. See note 73 supra.
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rent or future administrations. If the Executive applies its
authority only upon showings of a national security risk in situ-
ations of a magnitude at least equal to that present in Agee,
then perhaps these doubts may prove to be groundless.
Congress could remove many of the fears that the Haig v.
Agee decision raises by enacting passport legislation that gives
clear direction to the State Department on issues of national
security. For example, although the Supreme Court upheld
area restrictions on travel to Cuba in Zemel v. Rusk, Congress
later expressly limited the State Department's future imple-
mentation of similar restrictions, except in time of war or dan-
ger to American travelers' safety.79 Congressional guidelines in
matters of national security would help prevent any potential
for abuse.
Concluding that the State Department's passport revoca-
tion regulation had congressional approval, the Supreme Court
failed to assess adequately Agee's constitutional challenges to
the revocation.80 The Court simply assumed that Agee was a
national security threat 81 and that this fact, on balance, out-
weighed his constitutional arguments. This cursory treatment
of the constitutional issues raised by Agee is in marked con-
trast to the Court's careful analysis of the constitutional stan-
dards in both Kent v. Dulles82 and Zemel v. Rusk.83 Because
the Kent Court held that the State Department's regulation re-
stricting issuance of passports to Communist Party members
lacked implicit congressional authorization,84 the Court did not
need to reach the question of the regulation's constitutional-
ity.85 The Court nevertheless ruled in Kent that the due pro-
cess guarantees of the fifth amendment protect international
travel,86 and that when rights such as travel are curtailed, the
Court will narrowly construe any delegation of congressional
power.87 In Zemel, the Supreme Court, having found the nec-
79. See note 36 supra.
80. 101 S. Ct. at 2781-83. See notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text.
81. This factual question was not at issue in the proceedings. See note 74
supra.
82. 357 U.S. at 125, 129-30.
83. 381 U.S. at 13-18.
84. See notes 22-28 supra and accompanying text.
85. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 129.
86. Id. at 125. See note 25 supra.
87. Id. at 129. Justice Douglas's assertion shows the importance that he in-
tended to place upon international travel:
[A] s we have seen, the right of exit is a personal right included within
the word "liberty" as used in the Fifth Amendment. If that "liberty" is
to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of the
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essary consistent administrative practice to warrant implicit
congressional approval of the State Department's area travel
restriction,8 8 had to address the constitutionality of the govern-
ment's action, as the Court later had to do in Agee. 89 In assess-
ing whether a restriction is within the limits of due process, the
Court stated that it must consider the extent of the necessity
for the government's restriction.0 Emphasizing that only the
"weightiest" national security considerations allowed the gov-
ernment to restrict travel to Cuba, the Court factually sup-
ported its conclusion that these considerations were present by
noting the close proximity in time between the State Depart-
ment's action and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.91 The Zemel
Court also rejected first amendment protection of travel, be-
cause unlike the restriction involved in Kent, restriction of
travel to Cuba did not inhibit a person's beliefs and associa-
tions, only his or her actions.92
Applying Zemel, the Agee majority drew a similar distinc-
tion between Agee's speech and actions, concluding again that
the first amendment does not fully protect conduct.9 3 In addi-
tion, the Agee Court rejected first amendment protection for
parts of the content of Agee's speech, which were also subject
to national security regulation.94 The Agee Court did not con-
sider the argument, raised by Justice Douglas's dissent in
Zemel, that travel abroad is peripheral to first amendment
rights, because the right to travel is necessary to acquire the in-
formation required to make informed judgments and to give
Congress. And if that power is delegated, the standards must be ade-
quate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests. Where activities or enjoy-
ment, natural and often necessary to the well-being of an American
citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all dele-
gated powers that curtail or dilute them.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 23 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); note 35 supra.
88. 381 U.S. at 13. See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text.
89. 381 U.S. at 13.
90. Id. at 14.
91. Id. at 16.
92. Id.
93. 101 S. Ct. at 2783.
94. Id. The Court relied upon Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and
its national security exception to the first amendment in prior restraint situa-
tions, as precedent that national security can support restraint of content of
speech or publication. Justice Brennan's dissent considered this to be "hardly
a relevant or convincing precedent to sustain the Secretary's action here," 101
S. Ct. at 2789 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting), since the prior restraint exception
to the first amendment requires that the threat must be immediate, direct, and
irreparable. The majority made no attempt to establish those requirements.
See note 73 supra.
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substance to free speech and a free press.9 5 Although this as-
sertion on its face is valid, the Zemel Court had plainly rejected
first amendment protection to the freedom to travel abroad;
therefore, precedent reasonably supports the majority's first
amendment conclusion in Agee.
The Court's apparent failure to give adequate weight to its
own assertion in Kent that delegation of congressional author-
ity in passport cases must be narrowly construed is far less
supportable. Without any reference to the unique facts in
Agee's situation, the Court broadly declared that international
travel is subordinate to national security interests,96 thus ignor-
ing the narrow construction and strict review of national secur-
ity interests which Kent envisioned. Although the Court stated
that national security is a compelling government interest,9 7 it
made no specific factual showing of how Agee's situation satis-
fied this requirement. Even if national security situations defy
the drawing of a definite threshold, the Court ought to demand
a showing that the factual basis of a potential security threat is
compelling given the nature of current national events and for-
eign policy considerations. 98 To establish the government's
compelling security threat, therefore, the Court should have
closely analyzed Agee's conduct. Instead, the majority stated
that international travel is merely subject to "reasonable gov-
ernmental regulation," 99 resting this assertion only on the
Court's previous treatment of international travel in the con-
text of an economic regulation, a decision which also warned
that such a reasonableness standard might not be appropriate
for restrictions on passports.OO The Court left the restriction of
an admittedly constitutionally protected right dependent upon
the Secretary of State's broad discretion and interpretation of
what constitutes a national security threat. The Court's mixing,
perhaps inadvertent, of constitutional standards may further
weaken the protection afforded international travel, because
the Court appears willing to accept a lower constitutional stan-
dard in national security situations.O'
The United States Supreme Court's decision to uphold the
95. 381 U.S. at 23-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See note 35 supra.
96. 101 S. Ct. at 2781.
97. Id. at 2782.
98. The Court does have some experience in evaluating these factors. See,
e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 16 (national security implications surrounding
the Cuban missile crisis).
99. 101 S. Ct. at 2781.
100. Califano v. Aznovarian, 439 U.S. 170, 177 (1978). See note 55 supra.
101. See Gillers, supra note 55, at 67.
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revocation of Philip Agee's passport on national security
grounds gave the Secretary of State wide discretionary author-
ity, beyond the authority required by the facts of the case. By
finding implicit congressional approval of the State Depart-
ment's passport regulation from congressional silence in the
face of the Department's construction, and by not requiring
that only an established administrative practice can indicate
congressional awareness of the regulation, the Court effectively
overruled the prior standard in the passport area and ignored
its own requirement of narrowly construing delegated congres-
sional power. The Agee majority also failed to assess the con-
stitutional questions as fully as the Court had in Kent and
Zemel, perhaps implying that a less strict standard of review
for restrictions of constitutional rights is acceptable when a na-
tional security issue is involved. Unless Congress enacts new
legislation limiting the State Department's authority, or until
courts rule on future revocations, present and future Secretar-
ies of State appear to have overly broad discretion to revoke or
to deny passports when they determine that a national security
threat exists. Congress must give clear guidance to the Execu-
tive in order to remove the potential for discretionary abuses
by the Executive and to assure Americans of the continued vi-
tality of their freedom to travel abroad.
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